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In her rigorous yet pellucid reading of Kant, Béatrice Longuenesse draws 
her attention towards the conceptual role of the fi rst-person ‘I’ in ‘I think’. 
The concept and word ‘I’ is the bedrock from which all sensations, feelings, 
and emotions become propositionally self-ascribed. Pace Kant, Longuenesse 
makes the stipulation that there is a kind of consciousness propping up 
our ability to make fi rst-person judgments that is more fundamental than 
the consciousness of our body. This means that the ability to recognize and 
reference oneself as the ‘I’ engaged in cognizing is more conceptually funda-
mental than being an embodied, spatiotemporal entity. I, Me, Mine offers 
an entirely novel reconstruction of Kant’s apperceptive ‘I think’ before natu-
ralizing the ‘I’ in Kant via Freud’s developmental concept of the ‘ego’ (das 
Ich), which, vis-à-vis metapsychology, engages with the structural organi-
zation of mental processes qua emotion. Longuenesse ultimately draws out 
how Freud’s ‘Ich’ and its developmental account bears a striking similarity 
to the unity of representational contents that determines Kant’s ‘I’.
In reading Kant, Longuenesse’s metaphysical stipulation is that con-
sciousness in the rational unity of our thinking is more fundamental than 
consciousness of our proprioceptive body, for being attentive to the rational 
unity of content(s) in one’s thinking is what makes it possible to assess the 
standpoints from which we initially formulate, and then arrive at, shared 
universal conclusions. The quilting point of Longuenesse’s project is as fol-
lows: the availability of the concept ‘I’, as the concept referring, in any in-
stance of its use, to the entity of which the predicate in the proposition 
currently thought, ‘I am F,’ is true—that is, the availability of the concept 
‘I’ presupposes the capacity to think writ large (83). It follows that thinking 
means unifying and articulating the contents of mental states into concepts, 
propositions, and inferential patterns. For Kant, there is a fundamental 
difference between the self-consciousness proper to the thinking subject 
in the course of their thinking and the consciousness of themselves as an 
object in the world. This difference is made even more distinct if, in the 
latter instance, we mean one’s consciousness of themselves as an embod-
ied entity—the ‘I’ as a physical object. It follows that what Kant means by 
consciousness of oneself as a thinking subject is not and cannot be reduced 
to consciousness of oneself as a physical entity, as the philosopher Quas-
sim Cassam claims, despite it is intimately connected with the conscious-
ness one has of one’s own body (viz. proprioception). Just as Cassam has 
argued that awareness of oneself as a physical object is necessary to ground 
self-consciousness, Gareth Evans has proposed that the body is necessary 
to furnish any referential use of ‘I,’ including the self-ascription of mental 
states. Longuenesse’s intervention is, thus, to stake fertile grounds and op-
pose such readings, illuminating a more fundamental conceptual role that 
the fi rst-person ‘I’ expresses.
Consequently, Longuenesse begins the book by opposing this recent 
position amongst Kantian interlocutors, a tradition that attempts to map 
Wittgenstein’s use of ‘I’ as subject onto Kant’s consciousness of oneself as 
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subject. Longuenesse takes issue with those who emphasize the body as 
grounding any self-referential use of ‘I’, where our having available a con-
cept of ourselves as a physical thing located in space is necessarily involved 
even in the self-ascription of beliefs and experiences—namely, in the self-
ascription of mental predicates. Longuenesse thinks that this view, where 
embodiment is the bedrock for any use of ‘I’, meets the proper epistemic de-
mands for the usage of ‘I’ but does not capture the semantics of ‘I’. Longue-
nesse makes the case that Kant’s “representation with consciousness,” 
which posits the mental ascription of identities and differences, is a kind of 
higher-order consciousness that depends on phenomenal consciousness—
the qualitative ‘what it’s like’ to be the thinker of ‘I’ (i.e., ‘I’ as subject). Ac-
cording to Longuenesse, this is already in Kant’s Transcendental Unity of 
Apperception (TUA), which is governed by the rules of imagination as well 
as logical rules of judgment and inference according to which the contents 
of one’s representational states are reliably related to independently exist-
ing objects. Whether ‘I’ is a use of ‘I’ as subject or ‘I’ as object, Kant’s TUA 
enumerates a common ground: “the unity of self-consciousness … makes 
possible both our synthesizing representations into conceptualizable wholes 
… and our ascribing thoughts to ourselves in the proposition ‘I think’” (31). 
Thus, all uses of ‘I,’ even uses of ‘I’ as object, depend at least in part on the 
kind of information on which the uses of ‘I’ as subject depend vis-à-vis the 
activity of thinking—what is available to subjects via the combination of 
representations, which transpires as the “what-it’s-like-for-the-subject-of-
thinking”, or the “mode of presentation” of the “‘I’ as subject” (31). One’s 
qualitative awareness of thinking is immune to error through misidentifi ca-
tion as the fundamental reference rule (FRR) for ‘I’ steps in: “‘I’ is a word or 
concept that refers, in any instance of its use, to the author of the thought 
or the speaker of the sentence in which ‘I’ is being used” (23). Longuenesse’s 
intervention stresses that the concept ‘I’ presupposes the exercise of the ca-
pacity for unifying and conceptualizing mental contents: the very exercise of 
this capacity is conceptually expressed in the proposition ‘I think’. All other 
judgments are subsidiary.
Satisfying the FRR for ‘I’ calls for nothing more than being the thinker 
of the thought and speaker of the sentence in which ‘I’ is used. Having avail-
able the fact that one is, in any given instance of one’s use of ‘I’, the entity 
satisfying its reference rule requires the awareness of one’s being engaged 
in thinking. Yet, in many uses of ‘I’, the predicate that is self-ascribed is a 
predicate referring to some bodily property. Reviewing case studies of de-
afferented patients and referencing Oliver Sacks’ research, Longuenesse 
turns to empirical examples to demonstrate that proprioceptive conscious-
ness of one’s own body follows from a more fundamental consciousness of 
oneself as a self, an entity that counts as the referent of ‘I’ whenever ‘I’ is 
used by that entity (33–34). Longuenesse argues against the view that it is 
a necessary condition on the very possibility of a referential role for ‘I’ that 
its referent be an embodied, spatiotemporal entity, and that all ‘I’-users 
be aware of themselves as such an entity. It follows that consciousness of 
oneself as thinking is, as a matter of empirical fact rather than as a matter 
of a priori argument, intimately connected to awareness of one’s own body.
Longuenesse then turns to Kant’s view of self-consciousness by focusing 
on Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories and Paralogisms of 
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Pure Reason. Longuenesse fi rst deracinates the ‘I think’ from the TUA by 
analyzing Kant’s three syntheses: the presentation of sensory information, 
(its) reproduction in imagination, and apperception:
For ‘recognition under a concept’ to occur, all past representations, their regular-
ly occurring patterns, the reproductive associations those patterns have elicited, 
all those features must remain available for recognition. In other words, they 
must remain available for use in one and the same activity of apprehending, re-
producing (according to associative rules), and recognizing. This is how concepts, 
and thus representations of objects as falling under those concepts, are eventu-
ally acquired. (79)
As the precondition for objective representation of the world, ‘I think’ in-
dexes the unity of mental activity that conditions all particular instances 
of ‘I think P’. Parsing the Transcendental Deduction, Longuenesse shows 
how Kant develops an analysis of the type of self-consciousness grounding 
the proposition ‘I think’ and the role of ‘I’ in that proposition. Countering 
Descartes’ cogito argument, Kant’s Paralogism of Substantiality criticizes 
the fallacious inference by which rationalist metaphysicians support their 
claim that the referent of ‘I’ in ‘I think’ is a soul, a thinking substance. In the 
Paralogism of Substantiality, Kant criticizes the inference by which ratio-
nalist metaphysicians support their claim that the soul is also a simple sub-
stance, distinct from the body. Developing these paralogisms, Longuenesse 
underscores that the concept ‘I’ is but a logically singular term, expressing 
the thinker’s consciousness of the logical connectedness of their thoughts. 
In the Paralogism of Personality, Kant criticizes rationalists for, again, 
engaging in a fallacy of equivocation. For rationalist metaphysics, as think-
ing beings we are immediately aware of our own ‘numerical identity’ at dif-
ferent times and, as such, we are persons. Kant argues that we are aware of 
our own ‘numerical identity’ at different times not in virtue of mere think-
ing (thinking ‘I think’), but insofar as we, as thinking beings, are capable 
of consciousness of our continued existence as spatiotemporal, empirically 
given, embodied entities. Accordingly, Longuenesse develops a positive no-
tion of persons as embodied entities endowed with unity of apperception. 
This is not the conclusion in Kant but one Longuenesse teases out. Longue-
nesse denies that the consciousness of the ‘numerical identity’ of any entity, 
including oneself, is possible for us other than by relying on criteria for 
identifying and re-identifying that entity in space and time.
The negative result from Kant’s Paralogisms is that even though, in 
thinking, we develop an implicit or explicit conception of ourselves as the 
agent of our thoughts—indivisibly present in all instances of our thinking, 
numerically identical in different times and distinct from our bodies—that 
conception has neither a priori metaphysical support nor empirical support. 
We cannot derive any objectively justifi ed belief in our persisting existence 
from the fi rst-person consciousness of ourselves in thinking. Hence the posi-
tive thesis: the only way we are objectively justifi ed in believing ourselves to 
be entities that persist through time, and the only way we are able to track 
our own existence through time, is by adopting a (supplementary) third-per-
son standpoint on our own existence as the existence of an embodied entity. 
Longuenesse then scrutinizes Kant’s Third Antinomy and the concept 
of “person” as an “empirically accessible” entity that is not “necessary and 
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suffi cient for practical use” (152). As one cannot posit an “uncaused cause” 
sui generis, the ratio cognoscendi of metaphysical freedom must include not 
only a psychological notion but also a moral notion. That is, a person is a 
conscious being that has a rational will, a faculty of desire determined un-
der moral law—this is linked to the “moral ‘I ought to’”(173). 
Longuenesse argues that Kant’s view of the structure of our mental life, 
grounding the use of ‘I’ in ‘I think’ and in ‘I ought to’, fi nds a descendant in 
Freuds ‘ego’ and ‘super-ego.’ Notably, Freud underscores that Kant’s Cat-
egorical Imperative is the “‘direct heir of the Oedipus complex’” (220). Un-
like the unity of apperception expressed in ‘I think’, indexed to a particular 
body and extending to self-consciousness in instrumental and prudential 
reasoning, the use of ‘I’ in the moral command depends on consciousness 
of oneself as the subject of an activity of reasoning that determines the 
maxims of one’s actions under the Categorical Imperative’s unconditional 
demand (217). Freud’s account of the structure of mental life—‘ego’—pro-
vides a developmental story for the unity of apperception grounding the use 
of ‘I’ in ‘I think’; similarly, Freud’s account of the unconscious component—
‘super-ego’—and its compulsive power provides a developmental story for 
the confl icted structure of mental life that grounds Kant’s use of ‘I’ in the 
moral ‘I ought to’. The unconditional character of morality is, for Kant, orig-
inally grounded in pure reason affecting the faculty of desire; for Freud, it 
is originally grounded in the raw emotion that binds us to the (authority-)
fi gure “from which we have learned the rules of our socialization” (221).
Longuenesse’s project defends the intimate connection, and distinction, 
between consciousness of oneself in thinking and consciousness of one’s own 
embodied existence without appealing to the noumenal realm. Specifi cally, 
Freud’s metapsychological analysis of mind naturalizes Kant’s analysis of 
‘I’ in its theoretical and practical uses: ‘I think’ and ‘I (morally) ought to’, re-
spectively. Longuenesse thereby outlines a kind of self-consciousness that, 
while intimately connected to consciousness of one’s own body, is neverthe-
less distinct from it and is, moreover, the condition for any use of ‘I’. Bridging 
Kant and Freud while unspooling an intervention countering those readers 
of Kant who have recently set embodiment as the fundamental aperture for 
cognition, Longuenesse’s comprehensive project sets her beside those philo-
sophical giants like P.F. Strawson and Wilfrid Sellars who have prodded 
forth novel modes of naturalized Kantianism.
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